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COMMENTS
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE CONTINUED VIABILITY OF THE
LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE AS IT APPLIES TO PRODUCT
WARNINGS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Judicial decisions," as well as statutory enactments,2 have removed
many of the traditional stumbling blocks which formerly hampered an
injured plaintiff's recovery against the manufacturer of a defective prod-
uct. Concomitantly, the past few decades have seen a dramatic increase in
the number of product liability suits brought by injured consumers di-
rectly against manufacturers.3 These product liability suits have involved
1. Absent fraud, early nineteenth century consumers had no cause of action against the
manufacturer or seller of a defective product under any theory, contract or tort. W. KEETON,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 95A, at 679 (5th ed. 1984). The Industrial Revolution pre-
cipitated the development of recovery under warranty theory. Id. at 679-80. Recovery under
warranty theories was hampered by privity requirements which limited the class of plaintiffs
to "the purchaser or one standing in the shoes of the purchaser as a third party beneficiary."
Id. at 681.
Under warranty theories of product liability law, the privity requirement was difficult to
overcome. See Gilliam, Products Liability in A Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REv. 119, 153-55 (1958)
(noting that courts have resorted to 28 "legal fictions" to avoid the privity obstacle). Ulti-
mately, the privity requirement under the warranty theory was.abrogated in most jurisdic-
tions following the rationale in the leading cases in the area. See Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35
P.2d 1090 (1934). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
A recovery under negligence theory for products liability was first recognized in MacPher-
son v. Buick Motors Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). MacPherson held that a man-
ufacturer may be held liable in negligence to a third party absent privity of contract if the
product "is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made" and
"there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests." Id. at -_, 111 N.E. at 1053. American jurisdictions have unan-
imously accepted the negligence theory of products liability. See W. KEETON, supra, § 96, at
683.
Finally, many jurisdictions have judicially adopted strict liability in tort which permits a
plaintiff's recovery absent privity of contract or proof of negligence. See Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rv. 791 (1966); see also 1 PROD.
LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 4016, at 4026-27 (1984) (table of jurisdictions adopting strict liability).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, detailing the elements of a cause of action
under strict liability in tort, has been incorporated into the common law of a majority of
states. See id. 1 4030.
2. See generally 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 1 90,112-95,270 (1981) (listing state statutes
treating products liability).
3. A survey of product liability litigation in eight sample states revealed that the number
of appellate cases during the period of January 1971 through September 1976 showed a 71%
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the full range of manufactured products and have proceeded under three
basic theories of recovery.4 While no single type of product, either be-
cause of its use or purpose, has been immune from products liability
suits, some types of products have special relationships between manufac-
turer and consumer which affect the theory of recovery.
One such type of product is ethical drugs.5 Ethical drug manufacturers
have experienced the same increase in products liability litigation as was
felt by other manufacturers;6 however, a special body of law has emerged
with regard to the duty to warn element in such products liability cases.7
Ethical drug manufacturers will be held to the same degree of care and
expertise as other manufacturers,8 but, because of the unusual relation-
increase over the 1965 through 1970 period. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL REPORT, ch. 6 at 38 (1978); see also Knepper, Review of
Recent Tort Trends, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 89 (1986).
4. A cause of action may be asserted under one or more of three basic theories: negli-
gence, strict liability in tort, and warranty. W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 98, at 694. It is
generally agreed that regardless of the theory the plaintiff must prove: (1) the product was
defective; (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the defendant's hands; (3) the
defect caused the harm; (4) this harm is appropriately assignable to the identified defect. A.
WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DONOHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONA-
BLY SAFE PRODUCT 17 (1978). In a product liability action based on negligence, the plaintiff
must also establish that the manufacturer's conduct was unreasonable. Id.; see also Stone v.
Smith, Klein & French Laboratories, 731 F.2d 1578 (11th Cir. 1984) ("§ 402A does no more
than codify the principles of negligence"); Werner v. The Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th
Cir. 1980) (finding the issue under either theory is essentially: "was the warning ade-
quate?"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). See generally Wrubel, Liability for Failure to
Warn or Instruct, PRODUCT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS--PREVENTION AND DEFENSE
(1985); Wall, Strict Liability and Negligence: The Distinguishable Twins of Products Lia-
bility, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 319 (1985).
5. The term "ethical drug" is frequently used in judicial opinions to denote products
which by law, 21 U.S.C. § 353 (b)(1) (1982), may be dispensed only by a doctor or by a
doctor's prescription as opposed to products which may be purchased over-the-counter. See,
e.g., Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1981).
6. Drug product liability and malpractice actions filed annually tripled between 1976 and
1982. 7 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, DRUGS IN LITIGATION (2d ed. 1982), reprinted in 1
DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 1.01 n.1 (1985).
7. See generally Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Direction for Use and the Duty to
Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145 (1955); Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25
VAND. L. REV. 131 (1972); Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturers'
Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (1964); Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735 (1980).
8. Ethical drug manufacturers must exercise the reasonable care, skill, and knowledge of
experts in the field of pharmacology. Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 235 Kan. 387,
-, 681 P.2d 1038, 1051 (1984). It is the manufacturer's duty to disclose to the medical
profession any risk or contraindications associated with the use of his drug. Brooks v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1984). The manufacturer has an ongoing duty to
revise and update prescription information and to notify the medical profession of subse-
quent discoveries. Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980).
Drug information is disseminated through package labels and inserts, "Dear Doctor" letters,
sales representatives, and advertising. Britain, Product Honesty is the Best Policy: A Coin-
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ship between the manufacturer and the consumer of ethical drugs, a vast
majority of states hold that the drug manufacturer must warn only the
physician who prescribes the drug and not the patient who ultimately
consumes the drug.9 The jurisdictions adopting this so-called "learned in-
termediary rule" recognize that the physician prescribing the drug stands
between the manufacturer and the consumer as the proper conduit for
information regarding risks associated with the drug's use.10 Therefore,
the manufacturer is exculpated from liability for what would otherwise be
a breach of the duty to warn the consumer if an adequate warning as to
the risks attendant with the drug's use was furnished to the physician/
learned intermediary.""
The subject of much litigation in drug products liability cases has been
the issue of whom an ethical drug manufacturer must warn regarding the
risks associated with use of a prescription drug." This comment will focus
on the question of whom the drug manufacturer must warn. It examines
several recent court decisions which cast doubt on the continued validity
of the learned intermediary rule and the potential impact of these deci-
sions on the duty to warn element in a drug products liability case. This
comment will conclude that, whenever possible, the law should require
that the manufacturer warn the consumer or affected party directly.
However, it is also noted that the learned intermediary rule should con-
tinue to be a valid defense in the following situations: (1) where the ad-
verse effects of an ethical drug involve medical complexities which cannot
be translated into ordinary language; and (2) where warning the consumer
of the drug's adverse effects would amount to a meaningless gesture on
parison of Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance
of Consumer Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 342, 385
(1984).
The duty to warn element, however, does not shield the ethical drug manufacturer from
liability for negligence in the manufacturing of his product. Thus if a drug causes injury
because of contamination or because of defective packaging, the manufacturer will be liable
to the consumer for any injury that results from such defects. Likewise, if a drug could be
produced without the use of an injurious ingredient, the manufacturer would be liable.
9. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
10. The ethical drug manufacturer's duty is to warn the physician who acts as a learned
intermediary between the manufacturer and the consumer. Safe and effective use of ethical
drugs requires medical expertise and detailed warnings which, if given directly to the pa-
tient, might "mislead patients" or interfere with the physician/patient relationship. See in-
fra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
11. The learned intermediary rule emphasizes the role of the physician in prescribing any
drug. In making a medical judgment as to the appropriate course of treatment in an individ-
ual case, the physician's knowledge of the patient is balanced against the risk and benefits
of the drug. The physician acts as a learned intermediary between the manufacturer and the
consumer to insure that the patient makes an "informed decision" regarding his treatment.
See generally 1 DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LuaDIrry § 1.05 (1)-(2), (5) (1985). See infra notes
35-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 32.
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the part of the manufacturer. Overall, the continued validity of the
learned intermediary rule must be determined on a case-by-case basis in
light of the merits of the individual claim.
I. MODERN DRUG MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO WARN
A. The Emergence of the Learned Intermediary Rule
1. The Ethical Drug Dilemma
Discoveries and developments in the field of ethical drugs have been a
source of immeasurable benefit to mankind,' 3 but with these benefits
have come a grave potential for danger.' 4 Some ethical drugs, while ex-
tremely beneficial to one patient under one set of circumstances, may, in
another patient and under a different set of circumstances, be harmful or
fatal. Other ethical drugs have serious adverse side effects but, because of
their therapeutic and preventive characteristics, are still prescribed. Still
other drugs are experimental. In any case, the ethical drug may be "un-
avoidably unsafe' 5 for some patients under some circumstances, and
therefore an appropriate warning must be given to the consumer.'" In the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Dean Prosser summarized the situation
as follows:
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is
true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very
reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription
of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even
purity of ingredients, but such 6kperience as there is justifies the marketing
and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The
seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
13. Antibiotics used to treat infection in man are excellent examples of these new drugs.
Penicillin, the first of such drugs, was discovered in London in 1928 by Alexander Fleming.
A vaccine for polio, a crippler of man since ancient times, is another example of the wonders
of modern drugs. Research led to Dr. Jonas Salk's development of the first polio vaccine in
the early 1950's.
14. Vaccines are good examples of drugs which are highly beneficial to the vast majority
of the population but which have a potential for serious harm to some individuals. See, e.g.,
Conafay v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., No. 83-0637, slip op. (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 1985) (diphthe-
ria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine causing neurological problems in child); Car-
men v. Eli Lilly & Co., 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729 (1941) (rabies vaccine causing death
of patient).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). Unavoidably unsafe
products are those "which in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use." Id.
16. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.17
The dilemma recognized by Dean Prosser and others was how to reap
the benefits of these potentially advantageous and "reasonably safe"
drugs while at the same time protecting the consumer from unknown
risks. The dilemma was increased because drug manufacturers would not
produce and market such drugs for fear of the potential liability nor were
they in a position to warn the consumer about the potential risks under
the myriad of circumstances which might arise."i
2. The Physician Solution?
As early as 1941, the courts were faced with issues regarding the manu-
facturer's duty to warn the ultimate consumer of a drug obtained through
a physician.1 9 The court in Carmen v. Eli Lilly & Co.20 determined that
the manufacturer was not liable because the facts established that the
physician and the patient had been fairly and adequately warned regard-
ing the potential side effects of a rabies vaccine.21 In 1948, the court in
Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22 granted the defendant drug
manufacturer's motion to dismiss and held that a drug manufacturer
could not be found negligent for failure to warn the ultimate consumer of
a product which was available only by a physician's prescription.2
3
The problem with the rule articulated in Marcus was that, at this early
juncture, the loosely defined term "prescription drug" included many
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
18. Conafay, No. 83-0637. The court noted the following:
One reason courts are reluctant to apply the general requirements for strict liability
in cases involving drugs is that the imposition of such a standard would chin if not
smother the research, development, production and marketing of new prescription or
experimental drugs necessary to alleviate or cure ills to which persons are subject.
Id. at 5.
19. See, e.g., Carmen, 109 Ind. App. 76, 32 N.E.2d 729.
20. Id. In a wrongful death action against the manufacturer of rabies vaccine, the plaintiff
alleged the manufacturer was negligent for failing to provide a warning of possible side ef-
fects to either the decedent or his physician. The court noted that the facts established that
the decedent and his physician were fairly and adequately warned. It was unnecessary,
therefore, for the court to consider the manufacturer's assertion that their pamphlet "should
be construed to be for the information of doctors only and not for the information of lay-
men." Id. at _ 32 N.E.2d at 732-33.
21. Id.
22. 191 Misc. 285, 77 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1948).
23. The court granted defendant manufacturer's motion to dismiss because the manufac-
turer had made no representation to plaintiff. Id. at _, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 509. In dictum, the
court noted that if false representations were made to the physician, then a claim of misrep-
resentation to the physician for the benefit of the consumer might properly be made. Id.
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drugs which are now sold over-the-counter. The practice of defining pre-
scriptions to include such "safe drugs," which were in actuality not ad-
ministered under the supervision of a physician, placed an unrealistic
burden on the physician and unjustly exculpated the drug manufacturer
from its duty to warn. This definitional problem was alleviated in 1951
when federal legislation was passed. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act,24 for the first time, established federal criteria for classifying
products as prescription drugs.2 The purpose of the amendment was two-
fold: (1) to protect the public from abuses in the sale of potent prescrip-
tion drugs; and (2) to relieve retail pharmacists and the public from bur-
densome and unnecessary restrictions on the dispensing of drugs that are
safe for use without the supervision of a physician.2 6
The first case to articulate the modern learned intermediary rule was
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish.2 7 The modern rule states that the ethical
drug manufacturer has a duty to adequately warn only the medical pro-
fession of the risks associated with the use of a prescription drug.28 A
warning to the physician is adequate if it clearly discloses any risk or
contraindications the manufacturer knows or should know are associated
24. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
25. Id. § 353 (b); see Rachanow, The Switch of Drugs from Prescription to Over-the-
Counter Status, 39 FOOD DRUG Cosm L.J. 201, 201 (1984). As originally enacted, the law
contained no guidelines for distinguishing prescription and nonprescription drugs, and the
FDA for years issued administrative regulations attempting to differentiate drugs. Id.
The statute now provides that a prescription drug is one which is "habit forming ... or
... because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect ... is not safe for use
except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law ... or ... is limited by an
approval application." 21 U.S.C. § 353 (b)(1)(A)-(C) (1982). For a brief but fascinating over-
view of the development of drug regulation in this country, see Janssen, Outline of the
History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 420 (1981).
26. S. REP. No. 946, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1951 U.S. CODE: CONG. & AD. NEWS
2454.
27. 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966) (affirming trial court's decision that under Missouri law
the drug manufacturer had a duty to warn the purchaser's doctor of known, rare side ef-
fects). In the case of prescription drugs, the purchaser's physician was a learned intermedi-
ary between the drug manufacturer and consumer who, if properly warned of potential ad-
verse reactions, might have averted the injury. Id. at 85. The manufacturer who fails to
adequately warn the physician is negligent and is liable to the consumer. Id. However, if the
physician is warned about the drug's dangers, the drug manufacturer has no duty to warn
the general public. Id. The rule expressed in Sterling Drug was actually not new. Earlier
decisions found that manufacturers of drugs available only by prescription had no duty to
warn the general public. See, e.g., Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897, 899 (D.D.C.
1963); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, -, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 328
(1963); Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, -, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735, 741 (1951), aff'd, 280 A.D. 157,
112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952).
28. Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1981); accord Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370
F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); McEwen v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974).
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with the use of the ethical drug.29 This duty to warn is continuous, and
the manufacturer must notify the medical profession of adverse effects
subsequently discovered.30 Further, the ethical drug manufacturer is di-
rectly liable to a consumer for a breach of its duty to adequately warn the
medical profession.3 1
The vast majority of jurisdictions which have considered whether the
ethical drug manufacturer has a duty to warn the user have adopted the
learned intermediary rule.32 Some jurisdictions have extended the learned
29. See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1984); Stanback, 502 F.
Supp. at 770; Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, _, 423 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1981);
McKee, 648 P.2d at 24. The critical questions facing a court construing the adequacy of the
warning given by the drug manufacturer to the physician are whether the manufacturer's
written warnings were adequate in view of the medical and scientific knowledge available at
the time the drug was prescribed by a physician. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F.
Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977). There is a split of authority as
to whether the adequacy of the warning is a question of fact to be decided by the jury or
whether it is a question of law. Compare Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D. 400, 421
N.Y.S.2d 81 (1980) (reversal of decision upholding adequacy of warning as a matter of law
finding that it is a matter for jury) with Pierluisi v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 440 F. Supp.
692, 694 (D.P.R. 1977) (A warning by a manufacturer is deemed sufficient as a matter of law
if it is "sufficient to appraise [sic] a general practitioner as well as the 'unusually sophisti-
cated medical man' of the dangerous propensities of the drug.")
30. Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 637 F.2d
87 (2d Cir. 1980); accord Stanback, 502 F. Supp. at 770; McEwen, 270 Or. at -, 528 P.2d
at 528. Ethical drug manufacturers advise the medical profession of drug side effects
through package labels and inserts, "Dear Doctor" letters, sales representatives, and adver-
tising. Britain, supra note 9, at 385.
31. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 1970); McEwen v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, _p 528 P.2d 522, 529 (1974).
32. See Stanback, 657 F.2d 642 (applying Va. law) (polio vaccine); Brochu v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying N.H. law) (oral contraceptive);
Timm v. The Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112
(1981) (applying La. law) (antibiotic cleocin); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th
Cir. 1977) (applying Fla. law) (oral polio vaccine); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d
132, 142 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying Pa. law) (chloroquine phosphate); Basko v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (applying Conn. law) (chloroquine drug); Fellows v.
USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Md. 1980) (doriden); Lindsay, 481 F.
Supp. at 322, 347, 352 (oral contraceptive); Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp.
546, 548 (D. Conn. 1978) (oral contraceptive); Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (oral contraceptive); Chambers, 441 F. Supp. at 381 (oral
contraceptive); Pierluisi, 440 F. Supp. at 694 (Kenalog 40); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
263 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.S.D. 1967), af'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) (chloroquine
phosphate); Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, _, 577 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978) (anorexiant drug); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 989, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381,
400 (1971) (hormones); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Mll, App. 3d 540, _, 390 N.E.2d 1214,
1229 (1979) (oral contraceptive); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33,
-, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1979) (oral contraceptive); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 681 P.2d 1038, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 365 (1984) (oral contraceptive);
Mulder v. Parke, Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, , 181 N.W.2d 882, 885 (1970) (antibiotic
chloromycetin); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. 1967) (chloroquine
phosphate); Johnson v. The Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (antibiot-
1986]
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intermediary rule to include medical devices, such as cardiac pacemakers,
which are available only through the services of a physician.3 Moreover,
the manufacturer's duty to warn the physician of the contraindications
has been interpreted to encompass all physicians who may be involved
with the patient in the "decision-making capacity."3 4
B. The Rationale for the Learned Intermediary Rule
The reason most often cited by courts for adopting the learned inter-
mediary rule is that expressed by Justice Wisdom in Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories:3 5
We cannot quarrel with the general proposition that where prescription
drugs are concerned, the manufacturer's duty to warn is limited to an obli-
gation to advise the prescribing physician of any potential dangers that may
result from the drug's use. This special standard for prescription drugs is an
understandable exception to the Restatement's general rule that one who
markets goods must warn foreseeable users of dangers inherent in his prod-
ucts. Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in
formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician
can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibil-
ities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medica-
tion against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one,
an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both pa-
tient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies then, who must warn ulti-
mate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold over the counter,
in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the prescribing physi-
cian, who acts as a "learned intermediary" between manufacturer and
consumer.
3 6
ics); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, -, 527 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1974) (blood);
Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1974) (oral polio vaccine);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 288, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (1971) (antibiotic); Gravis v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (drugs used to make anesthetic);
Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, -, 577 P.2d 975, 979 (1978) (intrauterine
contraceptive device).
33. See, e.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying S.C.
law) (holding manufacturer of cardiac pacemaker had no duty to warn consumer directly);
McKee, 648 P.2d at 24 (holding manufacturer of intrauterine contraceptive device had duty
to warn prescribing physician); Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at -, 577 P.2d at 979 (manufacturer
of intrauterine contraceptive device fulfills its duty if it warns physician).
34. McEwen, 270 Or. at -, 528 P.2d at 529. In McEwen, the court reasoned that "if the
prescribing physician is entitled to make an informed choice in deciding whether the patient
should begin taking a prescription drug, it follows that a treating physician should have the
same information in making his decision as to whether the patient should stop taking that
drug." Id.; see also Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91.
35. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
36. Id. at 1276; accord Timm v. The Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1980); Davis
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968).
412 [Vol. 20:405
THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
Clearly, Justice Wisdom's characterization of the learned intermediary
rule recognizes the importance of the physician's role in prescribing a
course of treatment which includes ethical drugs to ensure the good
health of his patient. The physician is the most logical conduit for infor-
mation concerning the risk associated with a drug's use because he is the
only individual who has knowledge of a drug's risks and a patient's needs.
It is the physician who has the education and expertise to understand
the mass of information provided by drug manufacturers concerning the
benefits and risks of an ethical drug. If detailed warnings were given di-
rectly to the patient by the drug manufacturer, they might mislead pa-
tients, not to mention the interference which such warnings might cause
with the physician/patient relationship.3 7 Further, there is the practical
difficulty for the manufacturer of making the warning comprehendible by
the lay person and of labeling or directly communicating the information
to the ultimhte consumers.38
A physician is in a better position than the manufacturer to know the
needs of a particular patient. The physician's knowledge of the patient
and the drug are taken into account when the physician makes a medical
judgment as to the appropriate course of treatment for a particular pa-
tient. In addition, the physician is likely to be aware of a patient's com-
plete medical history and acquainted with related treatments; he may
therefore avoid adverse effects from reactions between drugs. If the phy-
sician is adequately warned of adverse effects, his decision to prescribe an
ethical drug will be based on an assessment of the best information avail-
able as to the benefits and risks in each individual case. Therefore risks to
the patient are minimized.39
Finally, the learned intermediary rule recognizes the natural depen-
dence of a patient upon the advice of his physician. The patient, out of
necessity, relies heavily on the expertise of his physician to help make
decisions in his best interest.40 The physician/patient relationship is one
which is infinitely more intimate than the manufacturer/consumer rela-
tionship. The physician is a real person, not a package insert or a label.
The physician can articulate a warning to a patient, answering any ques-
tions which the patient might have. In addition, the physician can recog-
nize a patient who might need more explanation. The physician is usually
more accessible for follow-up questions. In other words, no matter how
well the drug manufacturer may predict the circumstances under which
the consumer may need to be warned regarding risks, the physician's
warning is superior.
37. Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
38. Davis, 399 F.2d at 130.
39. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
40. Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, _, 423 N.E.2d 831, 840 (1981).
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Overall, it is the physician who selects a treatment based upon the to-
tality of the circumstances, and it is the physician who has the duty to
disclose to the patient any "grave risk of injury" so that the patient may
make an "informed decision" regarding the treatment.4 As one court
noted, the real issue is not whether the consumer should be warned of the
risk; instead, the question is "who is in a better position to disclose the
risks." 42
III. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE: ANALYSIS OF RECENT DECISIONS
In the last decade, litigants have tried to erode the learned intermedi-
ary rule but have been largely unsuccessful.43 However, recently inroads
have begun to erode the citadel. 44
A. The Mass Immunization Exception
The learned intermediary rule cannot apply if there is no doctor in-
volved in the dispensing of an ethical drug. For this reason, two major
decisions have created an exception to the rule where the manufacturer
knows, or has reason to know, the drug will be dispensed without a physi-
cian's involvement.
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,45 the plaintiff contracted polio after he
was vaccinated for polio at a mass immunization clinic. The manufac-
turer's salesman participated in the organization and promotion of the
clinic and was aware that a physician would not preside over the vaccina-
tions.46 Each bottle of vaccine contained 100 doses and a copy of the Sur-
geon General's warning which said there was a slight risk of contracting
41. Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, -, 577 P.2d 975, 978 n.2 (1978). See
generally 1 DIXON, supra note 5, § 1.05(2).
42. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984).
43. See, e.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (refusing to
recognize a duty to warn consumer directly of risk associated with cardiac pacemaker); Dun-
kin v. Synthex Laboratories, 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (refusing to recognize
a duty to warn user directly of inherent risk associated with birth control pills); Buckner v.
Allergan Pharmaceuticals, 400 So. 2d 820, 823-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), petition denied, 407
So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting argument that general rule should not apply
because manufacturer knew or should have known that the medical profession was not
warning patients of potential side effects); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192,
-, 423 N.E.2d 831, 839 (1981) (refusing to recognize manufacturer voluntarily assumed
duty to warn user directly by issuing warning pamphlets and use instructions intended for
user distribution); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24-25 (Okla. 1982) (refusing to recognize a
duty to warn patient directly of hazards associated with an intrauterine "device" as opposed
to a drug).
44. Pope, Recent Product Liability Cases Affecting the Pharmaceutical Industry, 38
FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 299, 301 (1983).
45. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
46. Id. at 125.
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polio from the vaccine. Neither the manufacturer nor the medical society
running the clinic made any effort to communicate this warning to the
public or to those receiving the vaccination. The polio vaccine was dis-
pensed to "all comers" without any patient-by-patient assessment by a
physician. The court found this immunization process to be analogous to
the sale of over-the-counter nonprescription drugs.47 The court held,
therefore, that the manufacturer had not met its duty to make sure the
drug warnings reached the consumers." Davis created the mass immuni-
zation exception to the learned intermediary rule, and six years later in
1974, Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories4 9 expanded the exception to include
polio vaccines administered in "on-going-programs," such as small public
health clinics, where no physician is present to make an "individualized
medical balancing of the risk." 50
The mass immunization exception to the intermediary rule is narrowly
limited to factual situations where there is no physician involvement in
the decision process and, hence, no individualized medical assessment of
the risks and benefits of immunization.51 Logically, if there is no physi-
cian involvement when the drug is dispensed, the learned intermediary
rule cannot apply. The mass immunization exception is well reasoned and
acutely perceptive because it recognizes the realities and limitations
which surround mass vaccine dispensing. This exception seems to put
substance over form.
B. Administrative Regulations-Creating a Duty to Warn
In Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,52 a federal district
court applying Wisconsin law held that violation of a federal administra-
tive regulation,53 requiring manufacturers of oral contraceptives to give
package insert warnings directly to the consumer, constituted negligence
47. Id. at 131.
48. Id.
49. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). The court concluded that
it was foreseeable that the vaccine sold to the Texas Department of Health would be dis-
tributed in an "on-going program" without the "individualized medical balancing of the risk
• . . contemplated by the prescription drug exception." Id. at 1277. The manufacturer,
therefore, breached its duty to warn foreseeable users or to see that the purchaser warned
them. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Iowa
law) (manufacturer's duty to warn extends to ultimate consumer in a mass swine flu immu-
nization case); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying Fla. law)
(polio vaccine administered by clinic); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377,
1381 (Okla. 1975) (polio vaccine administered through mass immunization program).
52. 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis.), amended, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
53. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1985). The package insert regulation was adopted under the Fed-
eral Food, Drug & Cosretic Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
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per se.54 The consumer, who allegedly received no package insert warning,
suffered a stroke which she claimed was proximately caused by the oral
contraceptives.5 The court reasoned that the federal labeling require-
ment was enacted to protect persons like the plaintiff. Therefore, the
court ruled that Ortho had a duty to warn the plaintiff of the side effects
"to the extent and in the manner provided in that regulation. '56 Thus, a
duty to warn in the manner required by the federal regulation constituted
a triable issue of fact.5
7
It is significant that the Lukaszewicz decision was strictly limited to
the drug manufacturer's failure to comply "to the extent and in the man-
ner" prescribed by FDA regulations." Federal regulations now require
manufacturers to supply patient package inserts to accompany the dis-
pensing of all forms of prescription-only contraceptives,59 estrogens,60
progestational drug products,"' and isoproterenal inhalation prepara-
tion.6 2 Obviously, these regulations have limited application both in the
number and nature of the products affected.6 3 Because the federal regula-
tions specify the form 4 and content 5 of the patient package insert, the
54. Lukaszewicz, 532 F. Supp. at 213.
55. Id., 510 F. Supp. at 962.
56. Id., 532 F. Supp. at 213.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (a), (b) (1985) (oral contraceptives); id. § 310.501a (medrox-
yprogesterone acetate injectable for contraception); id. § 310.502 (I.U.D.'s).
60. Id. § 310.515 (a hormone used therapeutically to prevent or stop lactation and to
ameliorate malignant tumors of the breast and prostate).
61. Id. § 310.516 (a drug with progesterone-like properties used to correct abnormalities
of the menstrual cycle).
62. Id. § 201.305 (used in the treatment of bronchial asthma).
63. In 1980, the FDA proposed a list of 10 additional prescription drugs to be considered
for patient package inserts (PPIs). The proposed regulations were never enacted, in large
part due to the opposition of organized pharmacology. Pharmacists opposed the regulations
on several grounds: (1) if every drug had one single use, PPI requirements would not be
difficult, but many drugs have multiple uses which makes it difficult to give the required
information; (2) to give this kind of information would require about 8 different PPIs; (3) it
would be difficult to give general information on prescription drugs that would not unduly
alarm the consumer; and (4) the PPIs would be expensive. Telephone interview with Clif-
ford Eugene White, J.D., Assistant Dean of Students, Medical College of Virginia School of
Pharmacy, Virginia Commonwealth University (Jan. 20, 1986).
64. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a)(5) (1985) (specifications for print size of patient pack-
age insert for oral contraceptives); id. § 310.515(c) (print specifications for estrogen PPIs).
65. See, e.g., id. § 310.501(a)(2), (3) (required information regarding oral contraceptives);
id. § 201.305(b), (c)(1) (adequate information for isoproterenal inhalation preparations).
If a regulation does not mandate the wording of patient labeling, the regulation requires
the FDA to make available, through publication in the Federal Register, sample patient
labeling which includes all the required information. See id. §§ 310.501(a)(8), 310.515(f),
310.516(f). The regulations further provide that the ethical drug manufacturer who adopts
the current version as published in the Federal Register has complied with the regulation.
Id.
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manufacturer need only comply with the regulations to fulfill its duty to
warn the consumer directly."6
Only in rare circumstances will a drug manufacturer fail to enclose a
package insert. Lukaszewicz was a fluke, and it is suggested that most
manufacturers will have no problems complying with the regulations. The
Lukaszewicz decision seems to be another exception to the learned inter-
mediary rule, but that is not the case. The Lukaszewicz court merely uti-
lized an alternate theory for recovery-violation of a federal regulation.
The Lukaszewicz court never addressed the learned intermediary rule.
C. Oral Contraceptives: Exception to the Learned Intermediary Rule?
Whereas Lukaszewicz eroded the learned intermediary rule by using an
alternate theory of recovery instead of an outright exception, three 1985
cases have gone much farther 7 and have created an exception to the rule
where oral contraceptives are involved. In these three decisions, the
courts examined the purpose of the learned intermediary rule6 s and con-
cluded that there are valid reasons why a manufacturer of oral contracep-
tives, and not the physician, should warn the consumer directly of the
dangers associated with the use of such drugs.6
In each of the three cases, the plaintiffs suffered a stroke caused by
their use of the oral contraceptives. All three plaintiffs received the drugs
from their personal physicians. The plaintiffs received and read the man-
ufacturer's standard package inserts which detailed the dangers and po-
tential side effects. In addition, two of the plaintiffs received a more de-
66. Ethical drug manufacturers do not find noncompliance with FDA regulations good
business practice. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act a drug packaged or
labeled in violation of a regulation is misbranded. 21 U.S.C. § 352 t (1985).
Misbranding of a drug is a prohibited act which may result in imprisonment or a fine or
both. Id. §§ 331(b), 333(a), (b).
67. See Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Odgers v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985); MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 250 (1985).
The defendant manufacturers in both Stephens and Odgers moved for summary judg-
ment. Their principal arguments related to whether an ethical drug manufacturer had a
duty under Michigan law to warn patients directly of the risk and potential side effects
associated with the use of oral contraceptives. Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 381; Odgers, 609 F.
Supp. at 869.
The question was subsequently certified to the Supreme Court of Michigan by Judge
Cohn of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Eighteen
months after accepting the certification question for review, a divided Michigan Supreme
Court responded that there was no rule of law in Michigan that would resolve the issue and
declined to state a rule of law regarding the certification question. In re Certified Questions,
419 Mich. 686, 358 N.W.2d 873 (1984).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 39-52.
69. Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 381; Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878; MacDonald, 394 Mass. at
-, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
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tailed booklet published by the manufacturer which discussed, in lay
person's language, the potential risks associated with the use of oral
contraceptives.
70
All three courts decided the learned intermediary rule did not apply in
cases involving oral contraceptives, and all three courts advanced similar
rationales for distinguishing oral contraceptives from other ethical drugs.
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,71 the only state case of the
three, expressed three main reasons for making such a distinction.72
First, the MacDonald court noted that healthy consumers of oral con-
traceptives actively participate in the decision to use this method of birth
control instead of alternative products. This heightened participation is
quite different from the patient's minimal involvement in the decision-
making process concerning drugs used to treat illness.73 In the first situa-
tion, the prescribing physician is "relegated to a relatively passive role,"
whereas in the second, the ill patient must rely on the physician's judg-
ment and advice for treating illness.74
Second, unlike the patient who uses a drug for therapeutic reasons, a
patient using contraceptives often has no ongoing relationship with the
doctor. The physician may examine the patient and prescribe a full year's
supply of oral contraceptives with only annual examinations thereafter.7 1
Because the consumer uses the drug for an extended time without an in-
dividualized medical assessment of the risk, she may seldom have an "op-
portunity to explore her questions and concerns about the medication
with the prescribing physician. '7 6
Finally, FDA regulations require manufacturers of oral contraceptives
to furnish written information to consumers regarding the benefits and
risks associated with the drug's use.77 These regulations for direct warn-
ings to the consumer were based on findings by the FDA that oral contra-
ceptives are generally taken electively by healthy women who have alter-
native methods of birth control available to them and that there is a high
incidence of serious side effects associated with use. Also, many women
70. Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 380, 382; Odgers, 609 F. Supp. 867 (the facts for Odgers
may be found in In re Certified Questions, 419 Mich. at -, 358 N.W.2d at 875-76); Mac-
Donald, 394 Mass. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
71. 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65.
72. The manufacturer's duty to warn is governed by state law. Two decisions written by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan were made in the
absence of controlling state law. See supra text accompanying note 69. The two federal
district court decisions adopted reasons which are, for the most part, the same as those the
MacDonald court adopted.




77. Id. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 69-70.
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do not remember the complex information required to make an informed
decision.78 Thus, the majority in MacDonald found that "oral communi-
cations between physicians and consumers may be insufficient or too
scanty standing alone fully to apprise consumers of the product's dangers
at the time the initial selection of a contraceptive method is made, as well
as at subsequent points when alternative methods may be considered. 7 9
D. Possible Effects of a Contraceptive Exception to the Learned Inter-
mediary Rule
With the exception of Lukaszewicz, every contraceptive case prior to
MacDonald involving the scope of the contraceptive manufacturer's duty.
to warn adhered to the learned intermediary rule. 0 These contemporane-
ous decisions, however, found that with oral contraceptives "patient
choice plays a much more prominent role than in the case of drugs pre-
scribed for the treatment of illness or injury."81
While contraceptives available by prescription only may be distinguish-
able from other drugs because their predominant use is for non-therapeu-
tic purposes,"' this supposition ignores the physician's duty to exercise
professional judgment before prescribing any drug.8 3 The court in Mac-
Donald, although limiting its decision to manufacturers of oral contracep-
tives," may reflect a liberal trend towards the courts' willingness to find
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule.
An initial reaction might be that such a legal distinction is justified;
however, a closer look at MacDonald might cause one to reconsider. In
MacDonald, the plaintiff received the patient insert required by the FDA
and a booklet distributed by Ortho which included information about
"the increased risk to pill users that vital organs such as the brain might
be damaged by abnormal blood clotting. 8 5 The warning also indicated
that abnormal blood clotting could be "fatal." 86 The word "stroke" was
78. 43 Fed. Reg. 4215 (1978), quoted in MacDonald, 394 Mass. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 69-
70.
79. MacDonald, 394 Mass. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
80. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, -, 475 N.E.2d 65, 73
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. In re Certified Questions, 419 Mich. 686, _, 358 N.W.2d 873, 884 (1984) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting), cited with approval in Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
82. In re Certified Questions, 419 Mich. at _ 358 N.W.2d at 884 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
83. MacDonald, 394 Mass. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 70. The two cases from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan also limited their holding to manufacturers of oral contra-
ceptives. Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 381; Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F.
Supp. 867, 881 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
85. MacDonald, 394 Mass. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
86. Id. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 71.
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not used in the manufacturer's literature.8" The court stated that a "jury
may well have concluded. . . that the absence of a reference to 'stroke' in
the warning. . failed to make the nature of the risk reasonably compre-
hensible to the average consumer."88s
If such a warning is inadequate, what warning might a manufacturer
give to the consumer? It would appear that the standard of what is "rea-
sonably comprehensible to the average consumer" is an impractical stan-
dard. As pointed out by Justice O'Connor's dissent in MacDonald, the
allocation of the duty to warn between the physician and the manufac-
turer is meant, after all, to ensure that the consumer receives the infor-
mation needed to make an informed decision.8 9
Faced with such a vague and nebulous duty to warn the consumer, a
duty which might differ from jury to jury, a drug manufacturer may find
that no warning is sufficient to meet the vague standard in MacDonald. It
is possible that the MacDonald standard imposes an "absolute liability"
which could inevitably prompt oral contraceptive manufacturers to with-
draw their product from the market.90 However, if the physician and the
manufacturer both take active roles in warning oral contraceptive users,
what the user does not understand can be clarified by the physician. As
long as physicians prescribe contraceptives, it is not implausible to re-
quire them to give adequate warnings concerning the drugs.
E. Back to Basics: A Sounder Suggestion-Kirk v. Michael Reese Hos-
pital & Medical Center
In Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center,91 the plaintiff
was injured in an automobile accident.9 On the day of the accident, the
driver had been treated as a patient at a hospital and, on doctors' orders,
was given Thorazine for oral consumption and an injection of Prolixin
87. Id. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
88. Id. at -' 475 N.E.2d at 71-72.
89. Id. at -' 475 N.E.2d at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. It is not overstating the case to say ethical drug manufacturers would cease to market
oral contraceptives. Consider the history of the National Swine Flu Immunization Program
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90 Stat. 113 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (j)(1)
(1982)) (amended 1978). Fearing a swine flu epidemic, the federal government attempted in
1976 to inoculate the adult population of this country in the largest immunization program
in our history. However, ethical drug manufacturers refused to produce the virus vaccine
until Congress enacted a measure making the government liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for any injury or death caused by the inoculation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 247b(k)(1)(B)-
(k)(3) (West 1982). For a written opinion of a case litigated under this act in which the
court gives a synopsis of the circumstances surrounding the bill's passage, see Alvarey v.
United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188 (D. Colo. 1980).
91. 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d 906 (1985).
92. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 909-10.
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Decanoate. 93 The jury found that the driver had lost control of the vehicle
because of diminished mental and physical abilities caused by these
drugs."' The injured plaintiff brought an action against the drug manu-
facturers, the physicians, and the hospital, claiming that each had failed
to provide adequate warning of the adverse effects associated with use of
the drugs.95
On appeal from dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, the ap-
pellate court held that the doctors, the hospital, and the ethical drug
manufacturers each owed a legal duty to adequately warn of adverse side
effects associated with the use of a drug which could result in injury to
members of the public. 6 Further, the court held that the duty to warn
was nondelegable and the negligence of the hospital or doctor did not
relieve the manufacturer from liability for any injury caused by the man-
ufacturer's failure to adequately warn.97 The court noted that the ade-
quacy of an ethical drug manufacturer's warning is a question of 'fact "de-
termined by taking into account all aspects of the warnings, including the
content of the warnings and how and to whom the warnings are con-
veyed." 98 The adequacy of a warning is not dependent upon a single act
or document; rather it is a question for "the trier of fact in light of all the
information provided by the manufacturer and all the information that it
was reasonably possible to provide."99 Thus, in one case, the trier of fact
may find an ethical drug manufacturer's warning was adequate if given
only to the physician, while in another case the drug manufacturer may
have a duty to warn the consumer. 10
The public interest dictates full redress for all who are injured as a
result of an ethical drug manufacturer's inadequate warning.101 But, as
noted in Kirk, the ethical drug manufacturer's duty "simply requires a
warning, not control or prevention."'0 2 Under a public policy analysis,
"the desirability. . . of extending any duty relating to doctors, hospitals
and [ethical] drug manufacturers must be determined by balancing di-
chotomous public concerns. The problem is to balance the just claims...
'against the public's claim not to be victimized by needless swollen medi-
cal costs.' ,'o0
93. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 909.
94. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 909-10.
95. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 910.
96. Id. at - 483 N.E.2d at 913.
97. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 911-13 n.5.
98. Id. at -, 483 N.E.2d at 911 n.2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at _ 483 N.E.2d at 912.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Editorial, Compromise on Malpractice, Cli. Tribune, June 8, 1985, § 1,
at 10).
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Kirk applied a more practical standard for determining when and to
whom an ethical drug manufacturer owes a duty to warn. Unlike the
vague standard in MacDonald, the Kirk standard is flexible and more
fair. Although MacDonald dealt with oral contraceptives, it is submitted
that the Kirk standard, which applies to all other ethical drugs, should
apply to oral contraceptives as well. Kirk, while it imposed a duty to warn
on the manufacturer, did not let the hospital or physician off the hook. It
is possible that if both the manufacturer and physician have a duty to
warn, both will take responsibility for protecting the innocent consumer.
IV. CONCLUSION
MacDonald exemplifies that the scope of an ethical drug manufac-
turer's duty to warn is a complex issue. Before analyzing to whom he
must give a product warning, the drug manufacturer must consider what
circumstances give rise to that duty and what constitutes an adequate
warning.
No rational person would quarrel with the notion that an individual,
sick or healthy, should receive sufficient information to make an informed
decision before beginning or continuing to take a powerful drug. This
does not, however, answer the question of what is the best way to ensure
that consumers receive reliable, understandable information. Nor is it a
guarantee to consumers that they will make the right choice.
Under the learned intermediary rule, manufacturers who fail to fulfill
their duty to provide an adequate warning to the physician are liable di-
rectly to consumers for injuries caused by use of the drug."', Moreover,
the disclosure standard imposed on ethical drug manufacturers may re-
quire manufacturers to warn physicians of incomprehensibly small
risks.10 5
MacDonald suffered a stroke when she was thirty years old.106 Risk of a
stroke to users of oral contraceptives at that age are 1.5 in one hundred
thousand.""7 It defies common sense to expect that MacDonald's injury
would have been prevented if Ortho had inserted the word "stroke" be-
cause it is unlikely it would have altered MacDonald's decision to use the
drug.
104. See supra note 34.
105. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968), the court
found that the chance of contracting polio from Type III Sabin vaccine was less than one in
a million. By contrast, the evidence showed the chance that an adult over the age of 20
would contract polio from natural sources was .9 persons out of a million. Id. at 130.
106. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, 67, cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 250 (1985).
107. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, -, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553
n.9 (1979).
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The basis for imposing on any manufacturer a duty to warn is to pre-
vent injury to the consumer. The learned intermediary rule embodies the
distinctive roles of the manufacturer and the physician in preventing in-
jury. The rule allocates to the drug manufacturer "the duty to gather,
compile, and provide to doctors data regarding the use of their drugs,
tasks for which the manufacturers are best suited."'' 10 The goal of
preventing injury will not necessarily be advanced by making the learned
intermediary rule inapplicable to product warnings for ethical drugs.
The law should require the ethical drug manufacturer to use the best
method available to reasonably assure that all the information necessary
for the safe use of its drug reaches those whose safety depends upon it. 00
Where a warning can readily be conveyed in lay person's language,110 a
drug manufacturer's failure to warn the consumer directly should result
in liability for any injuries to the consumer proximately caused by use of
the drug. On the other hand, many drugs present potential for adverse
effects not easily communicated because of medical complexities beyond
the lay person's ability to understand. In such cases the physician should
also have the duty to warn the patient.
Where appropriate, the learned intermediary rule should be retained as
a defense. The expansion of the ethical drug manufacturer's duty to warn
unguided by practical considerations has the potential to impose absolute
liability in situations where it is impossible for the manufacturer to warn
the user directly. Often, the ethical drug manufacturer cannot communi-
cate the necessary information directly to the consumer in a manner
which will minimize the risk. In such a case, only the doctor is in a posi-
tion to insure the safe use of the drug.
The question is "who is in a better position to disclose risks" to the
consumer."' Given this approach, the answer in each case to the question
whether or not an ethical drug manufacturer's warning is adequate re-
quires an analysis rather than rules or responses.
Barbara Pope Flannagan
108. MacDonald, 394 Mass. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388 comment n (1965) (chattel known to be dan-
gerous for intended use).
110. Examples of warnings written in lay person's language are found on bottles of over-
the-counter drugs such as Bufferin. The Bufferin label gives, in addition to dosage informa-
tion, a caution to consult a physician immediately if pain persists for more than 10 days or
redness is present. A warning is also given advising the consumer to seek the advice of a
health professional before taking the drug if pregnant or nursing an infant and what to do in
the event of an overdose.
111. Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984).
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